public void processServerCredentials(TlsCredentials serverCredentials) throws IOException {
// TODO[tls-ops] Process the server certificate differently on the server side
processServerCertificate(serverCredentials.getCertificate());
}
private void processHandshakeMessage(short type, byte[] buf) throws IOException {
ByteArrayInputStream is = new ByteArrayInputStream(buf);
switch (type) {
case HandshakeType.certificate:
{
switch (connection_state) {
case CS_SERVER_HELLO_RECEIVED:
{
// Parse the Certificate message and send to cipher suite
Certificate serverCertificate = Certificate.parse(is);
assertEmpty(is);
this.keyExchange.processServerCertificate(serverCertificate);
this.authentication = tlsClient.getAuthentication();
this.authentication.notifyServerCertificate(serverCertificate);
break;
}
default:
this.failWithError(AlertLevel.fatal, AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
connection_state = CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE_RECEIVED;
break;
}
case HandshakeType.finished:
switch (connection_state) {
case CS_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC_RECEIVED:
/*
* Read the checksum from the finished message, it has always 12
* bytes for TLS 1.0 and 36 for SSLv3.
*/
boolean isTls =
tlsClientContext.getServerVersion().getFullVersion()
>= ProtocolVersion.TLSv10.getFullVersion();
int checksumLength = isTls ? 12 : 36;
byte[] serverVerifyData = new byte[checksumLength];
TlsUtils.readFully(serverVerifyData, is);
assertEmpty(is);
/*
* Calculate our own checksum.
*/
byte[] expectedServerVerifyData =
TlsUtils.calculateVerifyData(
tlsClientContext, "server finished", rs.getCurrentHash(TlsUtils.SSL_SERVER));
/*
* Compare both checksums.
*/
if (!Arrays.constantTimeAreEqual(expectedServerVerifyData, serverVerifyData)) {
/*
* Wrong checksum in the finished message.
*/
this.failWithError(AlertLevel.fatal, AlertDescription.handshake_failure);
}
connection_state = CS_DONE;
/*
* We are now ready to receive application data.
*/
this.appDataReady = true;
break;
default:
this.failWithError(AlertLevel.fatal, AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
break;
case HandshakeType.server_hello:
switch (connection_state) {
case CS_CLIENT_HELLO_SEND:
/*
* Read the server hello message
*/
ProtocolVersion server_version = TlsUtils.readVersion(is);
ProtocolVersion client_version = this.tlsClientContext.getClientVersion();
if (server_version.getFullVersion() > client_version.getFullVersion()) {
this.failWithError(AlertLevel.fatal, AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
this.tlsClientContext.setServerVersion(server_version);
this.tlsClient.notifyServerVersion(server_version);
/*
* Read the server random
*/
securityParameters.serverRandom = new byte[32];
TlsUtils.readFully(securityParameters.serverRandom, is);
byte[] sessionID = TlsUtils.readOpaque8(is);
if (sessionID.length > 32) {
this.failWithError(AlertLevel.fatal, AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
this.tlsClient.notifySessionID(sessionID);
/*
* Find out which CipherSuite the server has chosen and check that
* it was one of the offered ones.
*/
int selectedCipherSuite = TlsUtils.readUint16(is);
if (!arrayContains(offeredCipherSuites, selectedCipherSuite)
|| selectedCipherSuite == CipherSuite.TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) {
this.failWithError(AlertLevel.fatal, AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
this.tlsClient.notifySelectedCipherSuite(selectedCipherSuite);
/*
* Find out which CompressionMethod the server has chosen and check that
* it was one of the offered ones.
*/
short selectedCompressionMethod = TlsUtils.readUint8(is);
if (!arrayContains(offeredCompressionMethods, selectedCompressionMethod)) {
this.failWithError(AlertLevel.fatal, AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
this.tlsClient.notifySelectedCompressionMethod(selectedCompressionMethod);
/*
* RFC3546 2.2 The extended server hello message format MAY be
* sent in place of the server hello message when the client has
* requested extended functionality via the extended client hello
* message specified in Section 2.1. ... Note that the extended
* server hello message is only sent in response to an extended
* client hello message. This prevents the possibility that the
* extended server hello message could "break" existing TLS 1.0
* clients.
*/
/*
* TODO RFC 3546 2.3 If [...] the older session is resumed, then
* the server MUST ignore extensions appearing in the client
* hello, and send a server hello containing no extensions.
*/
// Integer -> byte[]
Hashtable serverExtensions = new Hashtable();
if (is.available() > 0) {
// Process extensions from extended server hello
byte[] extBytes = TlsUtils.readOpaque16(is);
ByteArrayInputStream ext = new ByteArrayInputStream(extBytes);
while (ext.available() > 0) {
Integer extType = Integers.valueOf(TlsUtils.readUint16(ext));
byte[] extValue = TlsUtils.readOpaque16(ext);
/*
* RFC 5746 Note that sending a "renegotiation_info"
* extension in response to a ClientHello containing only
* the SCSV is an explicit exception to the prohibition in
* RFC 5246, Section 7.4.1.4, on the server sending
* unsolicited extensions and is only allowed because the
* client is signaling its willingness to receive the
* extension via the TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
* SCSV. TLS implementations MUST continue to comply with
* Section 7.4.1.4 for all other extensions.
*/
if (!extType.equals(EXT_RenegotiationInfo)
&& clientExtensions.get(extType) == null) {
/*
* RFC 3546 2.3 Note that for all extension types
* (including those defined in future), the extension
* type MUST NOT appear in the extended server hello
* unless the same extension type appeared in the
* corresponding client hello. Thus clients MUST abort
* the handshake if they receive an extension type in
* the extended server hello that they did not request
* in the associated (extended) client hello.
*/
this.failWithError(AlertLevel.fatal, AlertDescription.unsupported_extension);
}
if (serverExtensions.containsKey(extType)) {
/*
* RFC 3546 2.3 Also note that when multiple
* extensions of different types are present in the
* extended client hello or the extended server hello,
* the extensions may appear in any order. There MUST
* NOT be more than one extension of the same type.
*/
this.failWithError(AlertLevel.fatal, AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
serverExtensions.put(extType, extValue);
}
}
assertEmpty(is);
/*
* RFC 5746 3.4. When a ServerHello is received, the client MUST
* check if it includes the "renegotiation_info" extension:
*/
{
boolean secure_negotiation = serverExtensions.containsKey(EXT_RenegotiationInfo);
/*
* If the extension is present, set the secure_renegotiation
* flag to TRUE. The client MUST then verify that the length
* of the "renegotiated_connection" field is zero, and if it
* is not, MUST abort the handshake (by sending a fatal
* handshake_failure alert).
*/
if (secure_negotiation) {
byte[] renegExtValue = (byte[]) serverExtensions.get(EXT_RenegotiationInfo);
if (!Arrays.constantTimeAreEqual(
renegExtValue, createRenegotiationInfo(emptybuf))) {
this.failWithError(AlertLevel.fatal, AlertDescription.handshake_failure);
}
}
tlsClient.notifySecureRenegotiation(secure_negotiation);
}
if (clientExtensions != null) {
tlsClient.processServerExtensions(serverExtensions);
}
this.keyExchange = tlsClient.getKeyExchange();
connection_state = CS_SERVER_HELLO_RECEIVED;
break;
default:
this.failWithError(AlertLevel.fatal, AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
break;
case HandshakeType.server_hello_done:
switch (connection_state) {
case CS_SERVER_HELLO_RECEIVED:
// There was no server certificate message; check it's OK
this.keyExchange.skipServerCertificate();
this.authentication = null;
// NB: Fall through to next case label
case CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE_RECEIVED:
// There was no server key exchange message; check it's OK
this.keyExchange.skipServerKeyExchange();
// NB: Fall through to next case label
case CS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_RECEIVED:
case CS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_RECEIVED:
assertEmpty(is);
connection_state = CS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE_RECEIVED;
TlsCredentials clientCreds = null;
if (certificateRequest == null) {
this.keyExchange.skipClientCredentials();
} else {
clientCreds = this.authentication.getClientCredentials(certificateRequest);
if (clientCreds == null) {
this.keyExchange.skipClientCredentials();
boolean isTls =
tlsClientContext.getServerVersion().getFullVersion()
>= ProtocolVersion.TLSv10.getFullVersion();
if (isTls) {
sendClientCertificate(Certificate.EMPTY_CHAIN);
} else {
sendAlert(AlertLevel.warning, AlertDescription.no_certificate);
}
} else {
this.keyExchange.processClientCredentials(clientCreds);
sendClientCertificate(clientCreds.getCertificate());
}
}
/*
* Send the client key exchange message, depending on the key
* exchange we are using in our CipherSuite.
*/
sendClientKeyExchange();
connection_state = CS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_SEND;
/*
* Calculate the master_secret
*/
byte[] pms = this.keyExchange.generatePremasterSecret();
securityParameters.masterSecret =
TlsUtils.calculateMasterSecret(this.tlsClientContext, pms);
// TODO Is there a way to ensure the data is really overwritten?
/*
* RFC 2246 8.1. The pre_master_secret should be deleted from
* memory once the master_secret has been computed.
*/
Arrays.fill(pms, (byte) 0);
if (clientCreds != null && clientCreds instanceof TlsSignerCredentials) {
TlsSignerCredentials signerCreds = (TlsSignerCredentials) clientCreds;
byte[] md5andsha1 = rs.getCurrentHash(null);
byte[] clientCertificateSignature =
signerCreds.generateCertificateSignature(md5andsha1);
sendCertificateVerify(clientCertificateSignature);
connection_state = CS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_SEND;
}
/*
* Now, we send change cipher state
*/
byte[] cmessage = new byte[1];
cmessage[0] = 1;
rs.writeMessage(ContentType.change_cipher_spec, cmessage, 0, cmessage.length);
connection_state = CS_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC_SEND;
/*
* Initialize our cipher suite
*/
rs.clientCipherSpecDecided(tlsClient.getCompression(), tlsClient.getCipher());
/*
* Send our finished message.
*/
byte[] clientVerifyData =
TlsUtils.calculateVerifyData(
tlsClientContext, "client finished", rs.getCurrentHash(TlsUtils.SSL_CLIENT));
ByteArrayOutputStream bos = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
TlsUtils.writeUint8(HandshakeType.finished, bos);
TlsUtils.writeOpaque24(clientVerifyData, bos);
byte[] message = bos.toByteArray();
rs.writeMessage(ContentType.handshake, message, 0, message.length);
this.connection_state = CS_CLIENT_FINISHED_SEND;
break;
default:
this.failWithError(AlertLevel.fatal, AlertDescription.handshake_failure);
}
break;
case HandshakeType.server_key_exchange:
{
switch (connection_state) {
case CS_SERVER_HELLO_RECEIVED:
// There was no server certificate message; check it's OK
this.keyExchange.skipServerCertificate();
this.authentication = null;
// NB: Fall through to next case label
case CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE_RECEIVED:
this.keyExchange.processServerKeyExchange(is);
assertEmpty(is);
break;
default:
this.failWithError(AlertLevel.fatal, AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_RECEIVED;
break;
}
case HandshakeType.certificate_request:
{
switch (connection_state) {
case CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE_RECEIVED:
// There was no server key exchange message; check it's OK
this.keyExchange.skipServerKeyExchange();
// NB: Fall through to next case label
case CS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_RECEIVED:
{
if (this.authentication == null) {
/*
* RFC 2246 7.4.4. It is a fatal handshake_failure alert
* for an anonymous server to request client identification.
*/
this.failWithError(AlertLevel.fatal, AlertDescription.handshake_failure);
}
int numTypes = TlsUtils.readUint8(is);
short[] certificateTypes = new short[numTypes];
for (int i = 0; i < numTypes; ++i) {
certificateTypes[i] = TlsUtils.readUint8(is);
}
byte[] authorities = TlsUtils.readOpaque16(is);
assertEmpty(is);
Vector authorityDNs = new Vector();
ByteArrayInputStream bis = new ByteArrayInputStream(authorities);
while (bis.available() > 0) {
byte[] dnBytes = TlsUtils.readOpaque16(bis);
authorityDNs.addElement(
X500Name.getInstance(ASN1Primitive.fromByteArray(dnBytes)));
}
this.certificateRequest = new CertificateRequest(certificateTypes, authorityDNs);
this.keyExchange.validateCertificateRequest(this.certificateRequest);
break;
}
default:
this.failWithError(AlertLevel.fatal, AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
this.connection_state = CS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_RECEIVED;
break;
}
case HandshakeType.hello_request:
/*
* RFC 2246 7.4.1.1 Hello request This message will be ignored by the
* client if the client is currently negotiating a session. This message
* may be ignored by the client if it does not wish to renegotiate a
* session, or the client may, if it wishes, respond with a
* no_renegotiation alert.
*/
if (connection_state == CS_DONE) {
// Renegotiation not supported yet
sendAlert(AlertLevel.warning, AlertDescription.no_renegotiation);
}
break;
case HandshakeType.client_key_exchange:
case HandshakeType.certificate_verify:
case HandshakeType.client_hello:
default:
// We do not support this!
this.failWithError(AlertLevel.fatal, AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
break;
}
}