/**
* @param containingHtmlElement the name of the HTML element containing el. If the HTML element is
* contained inside a template construct then this name may differ from el's immediate parent.
*/
private void inspectElement(JobEnvelope source, Element el, ElKey containingHtmlElement) {
ElKey elKey = ElKey.forElement(el);
// Recurse early so that ihtml:dynamic elements have been parsed before we
// process the attributes element list.
for (Node child : Nodes.childrenOf(el)) {
inspect(source, child, elKey);
}
// For each attribute allowed on this element type, ensure that
// (1) If it is not specified, and its default value is not allowed, then
// it is added with a known safe value.
// (2) Its value is rewritten as appropriate.
// We don't have to worry about disallowed attributes since those will
// not be present in scriptsPerNode. The TemplateSanitizer should have
// stripped those out. The TemplateSanitizer should also have stripped out
// disallowed elements.
if (!htmlSchema.isElementAllowed(elKey)) {
return;
}
HTML.Element elInfo = htmlSchema.lookupElement(elKey);
List<HTML.Attribute> attrs = elInfo.getAttributes();
if (attrs != null) {
for (HTML.Attribute a : attrs) {
AttribKey attrKey = a.getKey();
if (!htmlSchema.isAttributeAllowed(attrKey)) {
continue;
}
Attr attr = null;
String aUri = attrKey.ns.uri;
String aName = attrKey.localName;
Attr unsafe = el.getAttributeNodeNS(aUri, aName);
if (unsafe != null && a.getValueCriterion().accept(unsafe.getValue())) {
attr = unsafe;
} else if ((a.getDefaultValue() != null
&& !a.getValueCriterion().accept(a.getDefaultValue()))
|| !a.isOptional()) {
attr = el.getOwnerDocument().createAttributeNS(aUri, aName);
String safeValue;
if (a.getType() == HTML.Attribute.Type.URI) {
safeValue = "" + Nodes.getFilePositionFor(el).source().getUri();
} else {
safeValue = a.getSafeValue();
}
if (safeValue == null) {
mq.addMessage(
IhtmlMessageType.MISSING_ATTRIB, Nodes.getFilePositionFor(el), elKey, attrKey);
continue;
}
attr.setNodeValue(safeValue);
el.setAttributeNodeNS(attr);
}
if (attr != null) {
inspectHtmlAttribute(source, attr, a);
}
}
}
scriptsPerNode.put(el, null);
}
private void inspectFragment(
JobEnvelope source, DocumentFragment f, ElKey containingHtmlElement) {
scriptsPerNode.put(f, null);
for (Node child : Nodes.childrenOf(f)) {
// We know that top level text nodes in a document fragment
// are not significant if they are just newlines and indentation.
// This decreases output size significantly.
if (isWhitespaceOnlyTextNode(child)) {
continue;
}
inspect(source, child, containingHtmlElement);
}
}
private void runTest(String goldenIhtml, String inputIhtml, Message... expectedMessages)
throws Exception {
Element ihtmlRoot =
new DomParser(
DomParser.makeTokenQueue(
FilePosition.startOfFile(is), new StringReader(inputIhtml), true, false),
true,
mq)
.parseDocument();
new IhtmlSanityChecker(mq).check(ihtmlRoot);
for (Message msg : expectedMessages) {
assertMessage(
true,
msg.getMessageType(),
msg.getMessageLevel(),
msg.getMessageParts().toArray(new MessagePart[0]));
}
assertMessagesLessSevereThan(MessageLevel.WARNING);
String checkedIhtml = Nodes.render(ihtmlRoot, MarkupRenderMode.XML);
assertEquals(goldenIhtml, checkedIhtml);
}