public static void remove(File sourceDirectoryRoot) {
Session session = sourceDirectoryRootToSessionMap.remove(sourceDirectoryRoot);
if (session == null) {
throw new RuntimeException("no such session:" + sourceDirectoryRoot.getAbsolutePath());
}
Sessions.remove(session.getSessionID());
}
private void handleDHKeyMessage(DHKeyMessage m) throws OtrException {
Session session = getSession();
SessionID sessionID = session.getSessionID();
logger.finest(
sessionID.getLocalUserId()
+ " received a D-H key message from "
+ sessionID.getRemoteUserId()
+ " throught "
+ sessionID.getProtocolName()
+ ".");
if (!session.getSessionPolicy().getAllowV2()) {
logger.finest("If ALLOW_V2 is not set, ignore this message.");
return;
}
switch (this.getAuthenticationState()) {
case AWAITING_DHKEY:
// Reply with a Reveal Signature Message and transition
// authstate to
// AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_SIG
this.setRemoteDHPublicKey(m.dhPublicKey);
this.setAuthenticationState(AuthContext.AWAITING_SIG);
getSession().injectMessage(messageFactory.getRevealSignatureMessage());
logger.finest("Sent Reveal Signature.");
break;
case AWAITING_SIG:
if (m.dhPublicKey.getY().equals(this.getRemoteDHPublicKey().getY())) {
// If this D-H Key message is the same the one you received
// earlier (when you entered AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_SIG):
// Retransmit
// your Reveal Signature Message.
getSession().injectMessage(messageFactory.getRevealSignatureMessage());
logger.finest("Resent Reveal Signature.");
} else {
// Otherwise: Ignore the message.
logger.finest("Ignoring message.");
}
break;
default:
// Ignore the message
break;
}
}
private void handleDHCommitMessage(DHCommitMessage m) throws OtrException {
Session session = getSession();
SessionID sessionID = session.getSessionID();
logger.finest(
sessionID.getLocalUserId()
+ " received a D-H commit message from "
+ sessionID.getRemoteUserId()
+ " throught "
+ sessionID.getProtocolName()
+ ".");
if (!session.getSessionPolicy().getAllowV2()) {
logger.finest("ALLOW_V2 is not set, ignore this message.");
return;
}
switch (this.getAuthenticationState()) {
case NONE:
// Reply with a D-H Key Message, and transition authstate to
// AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_REVEALSIG.
this.reset();
this.setProtocolVersion(2);
this.setRemoteDHPublicKeyEncrypted(m.dhPublicKeyEncrypted);
this.setRemoteDHPublicKeyHash(m.dhPublicKeyHash);
this.setAuthenticationState(AuthContext.AWAITING_REVEALSIG);
getSession().injectMessage(messageFactory.getDHKeyMessage());
logger.finest("Sent D-H key.");
break;
case AWAITING_DHKEY:
// This is the trickiest transition in the whole protocol. It
// indicates that you have already sent a D-H Commit message to
// your
// correspondent, but that he either didn't receive it, or just
// didn't receive it yet, and has sent you one as well. The
// symmetry
// will be broken by comparing the hashed gx you sent in your
// D-H
// Commit Message with the one you received, considered as
// 32-byte
// unsigned big-endian values.
BigInteger ourHash = new BigInteger(1, this.getLocalDHPublicKeyHash());
BigInteger theirHash = new BigInteger(1, m.dhPublicKeyHash);
if (theirHash.compareTo(ourHash) == -1) {
// Ignore the incoming D-H Commit message, but resend your
// D-H
// Commit message.
getSession().injectMessage(messageFactory.getDHCommitMessage());
logger.finest(
"Ignored the incoming D-H Commit message, but resent our D-H Commit message.");
} else {
// *Forget* your old gx value that you sent (encrypted)
// earlier,
// and pretend you're in AUTHSTATE_NONE; i.e. reply with a
// D-H
// Key Message, and transition authstate to
// AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_REVEALSIG.
this.reset();
this.setProtocolVersion(2);
this.setRemoteDHPublicKeyEncrypted(m.dhPublicKeyEncrypted);
this.setRemoteDHPublicKeyHash(m.dhPublicKeyHash);
this.setAuthenticationState(AuthContext.AWAITING_REVEALSIG);
getSession().injectMessage(messageFactory.getDHKeyMessage());
logger.finest(
"Forgot our old gx value that we sent (encrypted) earlier, and pretended we're in AUTHSTATE_NONE -> Sent D-H key.");
}
break;
case AWAITING_REVEALSIG:
// Retransmit your D-H Key Message (the same one as you sent
// when
// you entered AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_REVEALSIG). Forget the old D-H
// Commit message, and use this new one instead.
this.setRemoteDHPublicKeyEncrypted(m.dhPublicKeyEncrypted);
this.setRemoteDHPublicKeyHash(m.dhPublicKeyHash);
getSession().injectMessage(messageFactory.getDHKeyMessage());
logger.finest("Sent D-H key.");
break;
case AWAITING_SIG:
// Reply with a new D-H Key message, and transition authstate to
// AUTHSTATE_AWAITING_REVEALSIG
this.reset();
this.setRemoteDHPublicKeyEncrypted(m.dhPublicKeyEncrypted);
this.setRemoteDHPublicKeyHash(m.dhPublicKeyHash);
this.setAuthenticationState(AuthContext.AWAITING_REVEALSIG);
getSession().injectMessage(messageFactory.getDHKeyMessage());
logger.finest("Sent D-H key.");
break;
case V1_SETUP:
throw new UnsupportedOperationException();
}
}
private void handleRevealSignatureMessage(RevealSignatureMessage m) throws OtrException {
Session session = getSession();
SessionID sessionID = session.getSessionID();
logger.finest(
sessionID.getLocalUserId()
+ " received a reveal signature message from "
+ sessionID.getRemoteUserId()
+ " throught "
+ sessionID.getProtocolName()
+ ".");
if (!session.getSessionPolicy().getAllowV2()) {
logger.finest("Policy does not allow OTRv2, ignoring message.");
return;
}
switch (this.getAuthenticationState()) {
case AWAITING_REVEALSIG:
// Use the received value of r to decrypt the value of gx
// received
// in the D-H Commit Message, and verify the hash therein.
// Decrypt
// the encrypted signature, and verify the signature and the
// MACs.
// If everything checks out:
// * Reply with a Signature Message.
// * Transition authstate to AUTHSTATE_NONE.
// * Transition msgstate to MSGSTATE_ENCRYPTED.
// * TODO If there is a recent stored message, encrypt it and
// send
// it as a Data Message.
OtrCryptoEngine otrCryptoEngine = new OtrCryptoEngineImpl();
// Uses r to decrypt the value of gx sent earlier
byte[] remoteDHPublicKeyDecrypted =
otrCryptoEngine.aesDecrypt(m.revealedKey, null, this.getRemoteDHPublicKeyEncrypted());
// Verifies that HASH(gx) matches the value sent earlier
byte[] remoteDHPublicKeyHash = otrCryptoEngine.sha256Hash(remoteDHPublicKeyDecrypted);
if (!Arrays.equals(remoteDHPublicKeyHash, this.getRemoteDHPublicKeyHash())) {
logger.finest("Hashes don't match, ignoring message.");
return;
}
// Verifies that Bob's gx is a legal value (2 <= gx <=
// modulus-2)
BigInteger remoteDHPublicKeyMpi;
try {
remoteDHPublicKeyMpi = SerializationUtils.readMpi(remoteDHPublicKeyDecrypted);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new OtrException(e);
}
this.setRemoteDHPublicKey(otrCryptoEngine.getDHPublicKey(remoteDHPublicKeyMpi));
// Verify received Data.
if (!m.verify(this.getM2())) {
logger.finest("Signature MACs are not equal, ignoring message.");
return;
}
// Decrypt X.
byte[] remoteXDecrypted = m.decrypt(this.getC());
SignatureX remoteX;
try {
remoteX = SerializationUtils.toMysteriousX(remoteXDecrypted);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new OtrException(e);
}
// Compute signature.
PublicKey remoteLongTermPublicKey = remoteX.longTermPublicKey;
SignatureM remoteM =
new SignatureM(
this.getRemoteDHPublicKey(),
(DHPublicKey) this.getLocalDHKeyPair().getPublic(),
remoteLongTermPublicKey,
remoteX.dhKeyID);
// Verify signature.
byte[] signature;
try {
signature =
otrCryptoEngine.sha256Hmac(SerializationUtils.toByteArray(remoteM), this.getM1());
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new OtrException(e);
}
if (!otrCryptoEngine.verify(signature, remoteLongTermPublicKey, remoteX.signature)) {
session.showWarning("Bad revealed signature");
logger.finest("Signature verification failed.");
return;
}
logger.finest("Signature verification succeeded.");
this.setAuthenticationState(AuthContext.NONE);
this.setIsSecure(true);
this.setRemoteLongTermPublicKey(remoteLongTermPublicKey);
getSession().injectMessage(messageFactory.getSignatureMessage());
break;
default:
logger.finest("Ignoring message.");
break;
}
}
private void handleSignatureMessage(SignatureMessage m) throws OtrException {
Session session = getSession();
SessionID sessionID = session.getSessionID();
logger.finest(
sessionID.getLocalUserId()
+ " received a signature message from "
+ sessionID.getRemoteUserId()
+ " throught "
+ sessionID.getProtocolName()
+ ".");
if (!session.getSessionPolicy().getAllowV2()) {
logger.finest("Policy does not allow OTRv2, ignoring message.");
return;
}
switch (this.getAuthenticationState()) {
case AWAITING_SIG:
// Verify MAC.
if (!m.verify(this.getM2p())) {
logger.finest("Signature MACs are not equal, ignoring message.");
return;
}
// Decrypt X.
byte[] remoteXDecrypted = m.decrypt(this.getCp());
SignatureX remoteX;
try {
remoteX = SerializationUtils.toMysteriousX(remoteXDecrypted);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new OtrException(e);
}
// Compute signature.
PublicKey remoteLongTermPublicKey = remoteX.longTermPublicKey;
SignatureM remoteM =
new SignatureM(
this.getRemoteDHPublicKey(),
(DHPublicKey) this.getLocalDHKeyPair().getPublic(),
remoteLongTermPublicKey,
remoteX.dhKeyID);
OtrCryptoEngine otrCryptoEngine = new OtrCryptoEngineImpl();
// Verify signature.
byte[] signature;
try {
signature =
otrCryptoEngine.sha256Hmac(SerializationUtils.toByteArray(remoteM), this.getM1p());
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new OtrException(e);
}
if (!otrCryptoEngine.verify(signature, remoteLongTermPublicKey, remoteX.signature)) {
session.showWarning("Bad signature");
logger.finest("Signature verification failed.");
return;
}
this.setIsSecure(true);
this.setRemoteLongTermPublicKey(remoteLongTermPublicKey);
break;
default:
logger.finest("We were not expecting a signature, ignoring message.");
return;
}
}