/**
  * When the servers signature for the refund transaction is received, call this to verify it and
  * sign the complete refund ourselves.
  *
  * <p>If this does not throw an exception, we are secure against the loss of funds and can safely
  * provide the server with the multi-sig contract to lock in the agreement. In this case, both the
  * multisig contract and the refund transaction are automatically committed to wallet so that it
  * can handle broadcasting the refund transaction at the appropriate time if necessary.
  */
 public synchronized void provideRefundSignature(byte[] theirSignature)
     throws VerificationException {
   checkNotNull(theirSignature);
   checkState(state == State.WAITING_FOR_SIGNED_REFUND);
   TransactionSignature theirSig = TransactionSignature.decodeFromBitcoin(theirSignature, true);
   if (theirSig.sigHashMode() != Transaction.SigHash.NONE || !theirSig.anyoneCanPay())
     throw new VerificationException("Refund signature was not SIGHASH_NONE|SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY");
   // Sign the refund transaction ourselves.
   final TransactionOutput multisigContractOutput = multisigContract.getOutput(0);
   try {
     multisigScript = multisigContractOutput.getScriptPubKey();
   } catch (ScriptException e) {
     throw new RuntimeException(e); // Cannot happen: we built this ourselves.
   }
   TransactionSignature ourSignature =
       refundTx.calculateSignature(0, myKey, multisigScript, Transaction.SigHash.ALL, false);
   // Insert the signatures.
   Script scriptSig = ScriptBuilder.createMultiSigInputScript(ourSignature, theirSig);
   log.info("Refund scriptSig: {}", scriptSig);
   log.info("Multi-sig contract scriptPubKey: {}", multisigScript);
   TransactionInput refundInput = refundTx.getInput(0);
   refundInput.setScriptSig(scriptSig);
   refundInput.verify(multisigContractOutput);
   state = State.SAVE_STATE_IN_WALLET;
 }
 /**
  * Creates the initial multisig contract and incomplete refund transaction which can be requested
  * at the appropriate time using {@link PaymentChannelClientState#getIncompleteRefundTransaction}
  * and {@link PaymentChannelClientState#getMultisigContract()}. The way the contract is crafted
  * can be adjusted by overriding {@link
  * PaymentChannelClientState#editContractSendRequest(com.google.bitcoin.core.Wallet.SendRequest)}.
  * By default unconfirmed coins are allowed to be used, as for micropayments the risk should be
  * relatively low.
  *
  * @throws ValueOutOfRangeException if the value being used is too small to be accepted by the
  *     network
  * @throws InsufficientMoneyException if the wallet doesn't contain enough balance to initiate
  */
 public synchronized void initiate() throws ValueOutOfRangeException, InsufficientMoneyException {
   final NetworkParameters params = wallet.getParams();
   Transaction template = new Transaction(params);
   // We always place the client key before the server key because, if either side wants some
   // privacy, they can
   // use a fresh key for the the multisig contract and nowhere else
   List<ECKey> keys = Lists.newArrayList(myKey, serverMultisigKey);
   // There is also probably a change output, but we don't bother shuffling them as it's obvious
   // from the
   // format which one is the change. If we start obfuscating the change output better in future
   // this may
   // be worth revisiting.
   TransactionOutput multisigOutput =
       template.addOutput(totalValue, ScriptBuilder.createMultiSigOutputScript(2, keys));
   if (multisigOutput.getMinNonDustValue().compareTo(totalValue) > 0)
     throw new ValueOutOfRangeException("totalValue too small to use");
   Wallet.SendRequest req = Wallet.SendRequest.forTx(template);
   req.coinSelector = AllowUnconfirmedCoinSelector.get();
   editContractSendRequest(req);
   req.shuffleOutputs = false; // TODO: Fix things so shuffling is usable.
   wallet.completeTx(req);
   Coin multisigFee = req.tx.getFee();
   multisigContract = req.tx;
   // Build a refund transaction that protects us in the case of a bad server that's just trying to
   // cause havoc
   // by locking up peoples money (perhaps as a precursor to a ransom attempt). We time lock it so
   // the server
   // has an assurance that we cannot take back our money by claiming a refund before the channel
   // closes - this
   // relies on the fact that since Bitcoin 0.8 time locked transactions are non-final. This will
   // need to change
   // in future as it breaks the intended design of timelocking/tx replacement, but for now it
   // simplifies this
   // specific protocol somewhat.
   refundTx = new Transaction(params);
   refundTx
       .addInput(multisigOutput)
       .setSequenceNumber(0); // Allow replacement when it's eventually reactivated.
   refundTx.setLockTime(expiryTime);
   if (totalValue.compareTo(Coin.CENT) < 0) {
     // Must pay min fee.
     final Coin valueAfterFee = totalValue.subtract(Transaction.REFERENCE_DEFAULT_MIN_TX_FEE);
     if (Transaction.MIN_NONDUST_OUTPUT.compareTo(valueAfterFee) > 0)
       throw new ValueOutOfRangeException("totalValue too small to use");
     refundTx.addOutput(valueAfterFee, myKey.toAddress(params));
     refundFees = multisigFee.add(Transaction.REFERENCE_DEFAULT_MIN_TX_FEE);
   } else {
     refundTx.addOutput(totalValue, myKey.toAddress(params));
     refundFees = multisigFee;
   }
   refundTx.getConfidence().setSource(TransactionConfidence.Source.SELF);
   log.info(
       "initiated channel with multi-sig contract {}, refund {}",
       multisigContract.getHashAsString(),
       refundTx.getHashAsString());
   state = State.INITIATED;
   // Client should now call getIncompleteRefundTransaction() and send it to the server.
 }
 // Create a payment transaction with valueToMe going back to us
 private synchronized Wallet.SendRequest makeUnsignedChannelContract(Coin valueToMe) {
   Transaction tx = new Transaction(wallet.getParams());
   if (!totalValue.subtract(valueToMe).equals(Coin.ZERO)) {
     clientOutput.setValue(totalValue.subtract(valueToMe));
     tx.addOutput(clientOutput);
   }
   tx.addInput(multisigContract.getOutput(0));
   return Wallet.SendRequest.forTx(tx);
 }
  /**
   * Called when the client provides us with a new signature and wishes to increment total payment
   * by size. Verifies the provided signature and only updates values if everything checks out. If
   * the new refundSize is not the lowest we have seen, it is simply ignored.
   *
   * @param refundSize How many satoshis of the original contract are refunded to the client (the
   *     rest are ours)
   * @param signatureBytes The new signature spending the multi-sig contract to a new payment
   *     transaction
   * @throws VerificationException If the signature does not verify or size is out of range (incl
   *     being rejected by the network as dust).
   * @return true if there is more value left on the channel, false if it is now fully used up.
   */
  public synchronized boolean incrementPayment(Coin refundSize, byte[] signatureBytes)
      throws VerificationException, ValueOutOfRangeException, InsufficientMoneyException {
    checkState(state == State.READY);
    checkNotNull(refundSize);
    checkNotNull(signatureBytes);
    TransactionSignature signature = TransactionSignature.decodeFromBitcoin(signatureBytes, true);
    // We allow snapping to zero for the payment amount because it's treated specially later, but
    // not less than
    // the dust level because that would prevent the transaction from being relayed/mined.
    final boolean fullyUsedUp = refundSize.equals(Coin.ZERO);
    if (refundSize.compareTo(clientOutput.getMinNonDustValue()) < 0 && !fullyUsedUp)
      throw new ValueOutOfRangeException(
          "Attempt to refund negative value or value too small to be accepted by the network");
    Coin newValueToMe = totalValue.subtract(refundSize);
    if (newValueToMe.signum() < 0)
      throw new ValueOutOfRangeException("Attempt to refund more than the contract allows.");
    if (newValueToMe.compareTo(bestValueToMe) < 0)
      throw new ValueOutOfRangeException("Attempt to roll back payment on the channel.");

    // Get the wallet's copy of the multisigContract (ie with confidence information), if this is
    // null, the wallet
    // was not connected to the peergroup when the contract was broadcast (which may cause issues
    // down the road, and
    // disables our double-spend check next)
    Transaction walletContract = wallet.getTransaction(multisigContract.getHash());
    checkNotNull(
        walletContract,
        "Wallet did not contain multisig contract {} after state was marked READY",
        multisigContract.getHash());

    // Note that we check for DEAD state here, but this test is essentially useless in production
    // because we will
    // miss most double-spends due to bloom filtering right now anyway. This will eventually fixed
    // by network-wide
    // double-spend notifications, so we just wait instead of attempting to add all dependant
    // outpoints to our bloom
    // filters (and probably missing lots of edge-cases).
    if (walletContract.getConfidence().getConfidenceType()
        == TransactionConfidence.ConfidenceType.DEAD) {
      close();
      throw new VerificationException("Multisig contract was double-spent");
    }

    Transaction.SigHash mode;
    // If the client doesn't want anything back, they shouldn't sign any outputs at all.
    if (fullyUsedUp) mode = Transaction.SigHash.NONE;
    else mode = Transaction.SigHash.SINGLE;

    if (signature.sigHashMode() != mode || !signature.anyoneCanPay())
      throw new VerificationException(
          "New payment signature was not signed with the right SIGHASH flags.");

    Wallet.SendRequest req = makeUnsignedChannelContract(newValueToMe);
    // Now check the signature is correct.
    // Note that the client must sign with SIGHASH_{SINGLE/NONE} | SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY to allow us
    // to add additional
    // inputs (in case we need to add significant fee, or something...) and any outputs we want to
    // pay to.
    Sha256Hash sighash = req.tx.hashForSignature(0, multisigScript, mode, true);

    if (!clientKey.verify(sighash, signature))
      throw new VerificationException("Signature does not verify on tx\n" + req.tx);
    bestValueToMe = newValueToMe;
    bestValueSignature = signatureBytes;
    updateChannelInWallet();
    return !fullyUsedUp;
  }